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Cited by 434

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria

Gal-or, Esther·1986·The Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.2307/2297593
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Abstract

We examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the nature of the information structure. While in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept, in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs. The different information structure reverses the incentives to share information. While with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with Bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with Cournot competition, with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with Cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with Bertrand competition.

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Metadata

Authors
Gal-or, E.
Venue
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1986-01
Volume
53
Issue
1
Pages
85
ISSN
0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2297593
OpenAlex
W2138655215
Cited by
434
References
7
FWCI
18.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297593
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Gal-or, E. (1986). Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297593

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.