The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
Abstract
Competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property, dubbed the “schizophrenia” problem by Hellwig, that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price. An examination of information aggregation in a non-competitive rational expectations model using a Nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price. Given a distribution of private information across traders, prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium, and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral. With small traders, the model may become one of monopolistic competition, not perfect competition. In contrast to the competitive model, a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained, even when traders are risk-neutral.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1981) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(81)90026-x · Cited by 1,067
Market structure, information, futures markets, and price formation.
Kyle, A. S. (1984) · Cited by 184
Self-citationViable allocations of information in financial markets
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90116-5 · Cited by 87
Cited by
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
BLACK, F. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04513.x · Cited by 1,782
Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains
Aboody, D., & Lev, B. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00305 · Cited by 1,524
Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review
Blankespoor, E., deHaan, E., & Marinovic, I. (2020) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344 · Cited by 1,076
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., & Pedersen, L. H. (2005) · Foundations and Trends® in Finance · doi:10.1561/0500000003 · Cited by 820
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others
HIRSHLEIFER, D., SUBRAHMANYAM, A., & TITMAN, S. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04777.x · Cited by 723
A Demand System Approach to Asset Pricing
Koijen, R. S. J., & Yogo, M. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/701683 · Cited by 688
All the News That's Fit to Reprint: Do Investors React to Stale Information?
Tetlock, P. C. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq141 · Cited by 677
Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading
PAGANO, M., & RÖELL, A. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02695.x · Cited by 545
Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital
Lambert, R. A., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2012) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfr014 · Cited by 521
Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
Li, L., & Zhang, H. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0851 · Cited by 520
Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment
Back, K., & Zender, J. F. (1993) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/6.4.733 · Cited by 517
Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others
FOSTER, F. D., & VISWANATHAN, S. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04075.x · Cited by 505
When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?
ARMSTRONG, C. S., CORE, J. E., TAYLOR, D. J., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2011) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00391.x · Cited by 491
The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity
Bloomfield, R., O’Hara, M., & Saar, G. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.001 · Cited by 482
Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications
Biais, B., Glosten, L., & Spatt, C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/j.finmar.2004.11.001 · Cited by 471
Differential Information and Dynamic Behavior of Stock Trading Volume
He, H., & Wang, J. (1995) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/8.4.919 · Cited by 447
Can ChatGPT forecast stock price movements? Return predictability and large language models
Lopez-Lira, A., & Tang, Y. (2026) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104335 · Cited by 425
Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders
Benos, A. V. (1998) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/s1386-4181(97)00010-4 · Cited by 411
Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198296983.001.0001 · Cited by 406
Cointegration, Error Correction, and Price Discovery on Informationally Linked Security Markets
deB. Harris, F. H., McInish, T. H., Shoesmith, G. L., & Wood, R. A. (1995) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331277 · Cited by 366
Disagreement and Learning: Dynamic Patterns of Trade
BANERJEE, S., & KREMER, I. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01570.x · Cited by 362
Risk Aversion, Market Liquidity, and Price Efficiency
Subrahmanyam, A. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.3.417 · Cited by 340
Is there a dark side to exchange traded funds? An information perspective
Israeli, D., Lee, C. M. C., & Sridharan, S. A. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9400-8 · Cited by 310
Hortaçsu, A., & McAdams, D. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657948 · Cited by 296
Endogenous Market Thinness and Stock Price Volatility
Pagano, M. (1989) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297461 · Cited by 293
Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information
(2011) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta8126 · Cited by 284
Kyle, A. S., & Vila, J.-L. (1991) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2601007 · Cited by 273
Self-citationInsiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns
Bhattacharya, U., & Spiegel, M. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.2.255 · Cited by 255
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
Ellison, G., & Fudenberg, D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552793 · Cited by 156
Metadata
- Authors
- Kyle, A. S.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1989-07
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 317
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1986096635
- Cited by
- 963
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 30.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.