The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Abstract
Central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information which leads to use of an incentive scheme. As the planner revises the scheme over time to take into account information provided by the firm's performance, this induces firms to underproduce to avoid more demanding schedules in the future—the ratchet effect. This paper explores this phenomenon under the realistic assumption that the planner cannot commit himself to a revision procedure. We show that the ratchet effect exists, in the sense that the planner may choose a scheme which is suboptimal from a static viewpoint in order to induce revelation, with the marginal price of output exceeding its optimal static value.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism
Kornai, J. (1992) · doi:10.1093/0198287763.001.0001 · Cited by 1,429
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
Kornai, J., Maskin, E. S., & Roland, G. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205103771799999 · Cited by 749
Conditioning prices on purchase history
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0103 · Cited by 689
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911362 · Cited by 680
Self-citationCustomer Poaching and Brand Switching
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696352 · Cited by 629
Self-citationPerformance standards in incentive contracts
Murphy, K. J. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00013-1 · Cited by 549
Chapter 2 The theory of the firm
Holmstrom, B. R., & Tirole, J. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01005-8 · Cited by 442
Self-citationRegulation and information in a continuing relationship
Baron, D. P., & Besanko, D. (1984) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/0167-6245(84)90006-4 · Cited by 438
Predicting the “helpfulness” of online consumer reviews
Singh, J. P., Irani, S., Rana, N. P., Dwivedi, Y. K., Saumya, S., & Kumar Roy, P. (2017) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.08.008 · Cited by 431
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
Hart, O. D., & Tirole, J. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297403 · Cited by 425
Self-citationChapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice
Hepburn, C. (2006) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj014 · Cited by 416
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
Meyer, M. A., & Vickers, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262082 · Cited by 340
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555887 · Cited by 309
Self-citationA Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns
Fehr, E., Goette, L., & Zehnder, C. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143217 · Cited by 303
Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?
Hepburn, C., Grubb, M., Neuhoff, K., Matthes, F., & Tse, M. (2006) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2006.9685592 · Cited by 279
Price Cycles in Markets with Customer Recognition
Villas-Boas, J. M. (2004) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593704 · Cited by 259
Innovating big tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition
Petit, N., & Teece, D. J. (2021) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtab049 · Cited by 109
The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards
Puller, S. L. (2006) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2006.07.002 · Cited by 105
“6 The ratchet effect is discussed in other regulatory settings in Freixas et al. [9] and Dalen [6].”
BackgroundFintech for the Poor: Financial Intermediation Without Discrimination
Tantri, P. (2021) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfaa039 · Cited by 94
Metadata
- Authors
- Freixas, X., Guesnerie, R., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1985-04
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 173
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060441137
- Cited by
- 517
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.