The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
Abstract
This paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote-maximizing third party. The resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the Hotelling “median” equilibrium. Established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election. This provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two-party systems, namely that non-cooperative behaviour between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555136 · Cited by 1,649
Voter ideology in western democracies, 1946–1989
Kim, H., & Fording, R. C. (1998) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1023/a:1006882806861 · Cited by 323
The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics
Johnston, R., Hagen, M. G., & Jamieson, K. H. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511756207 · Cited by 272
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
EL COSTO DE COORDINAR: NÚMERO DE CANDIDATOS PRESIDENCIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1993-2010
LUJÁN, D. (2017) · Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) · doi:10.4067/s0718-090x2017000100002 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Palfrey, T. R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 139
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2042233114
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Spatial Equilibrium with Entry. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297710
- The paper
- Palfrey, T. R. (1984). Spatial Equilibrium with Entry. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297710
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
