The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
Abstract
An optimal contract design problem is considered. Contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness. An optimal contract is characterized in two cases. First, when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk-neutral parties who must make relationship-specific investments, it is possible to implement the first-best by a simple contract. Second, when a contract is being used to share risk, it is generally not possible to implement the first-best. When one party is risk neutral, however, it is possible to implement the first-best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationEfficient specific investments, incomplete contracts, and the role of market alternativesPreprint
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Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Rey, P. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951613 · Cited by 572
Efficient informal trade: Theory and experimental evidence from the Cape Town taxi market
Bengtsson, N. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.02.003 · Cited by 14
Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi
Telalagic, S. (2012) · Faculty of Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.1021 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Chung, T.-Y.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-10
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1031
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2027395801
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 6.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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