The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans, with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies. We analyse the problem of an agenda-setting reform-minded Government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity. The Government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce. We examine two types of political constraints: unanimity rule and majority rule, both in a one-period and a two-period horizon. The main results are the following. First of all, we show how adverse selection and time-consistency may generate the widely-observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform. Second, under a majority rule, it is shown to be possible for the Government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests. Indeed, the Government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals: the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions, while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group. These results suggest that, in a dynamic context, democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency-enhancing economic reforms. The results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in Eastern Europe.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
Cited by
Understanding Economic Policy Reform
Rodrik, D. (2018) · Modern Political Economy and Latin America · doi:10.4324/9780429498893-10 · Cited by 1,260
The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., & Svejnar, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.699 · Cited by 926
What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?
Dollar, D., & Svensson, J. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00569 · Cited by 469
A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform
Bai, C.-E., Li, D. D., Tao, Z., & Wang, Y. (2000) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1006/jcec.2000.1681 · Cited by 362
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173 · Cited by 325
Metadata
- Authors
- Dewatripont, M., & Roland, G.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-10
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 703
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2110266740
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 41.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297994
- The paper
- Dewatripont, M., & Roland, G. (1992). Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297994
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.