The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
Abstract
A yes or no decision must be made about some issue. All agents must agree. The “Coase Theorem” asserts that the efficient outcome will always result. Suppose the value (positive or negative) that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual. It is proved, under very mild conditions, that with independent types, as the number of agents increases, the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero. An example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given.
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Cites
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Crémer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913096 · Cited by 894
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956119 · Cited by 653
Oil field unitization: contractual failure in the presence of imperfect information
Wiggins, S. N., & Libecap, G. D. (1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 192
The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization
Libecap, G. D., & Wiggins, S. N. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261326 · Cited by 186
Pollution claim settlements under private information
Rob, R. (1989) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7 · Cited by 141
Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
Cramton, P., & Palfrey, T. R. (1990) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526626 · Cited by 120
The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers
Roberts, J. (1976) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90048-7 · Cited by 43
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Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
The governance of exchanges: members' cooperatives versus outside ownership
Hart, O. (1996) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/12.4.53 · Cited by 367
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
Menezes, F. M., Monteiro, P. K., & Temimi, A. (2001) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00059-3 · Cited by 76
Metadata
- Authors
- Mailath, G. J., & Postlewaite, A.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1990-07
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 351
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2051805744
- Cited by
- 412
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 13.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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