The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices
Overview
Integrity signals
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Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“For example, public trading of shares in stock markets that efficiently reflect information about firms allows owners to link managerial compensation to stock prices and better align the interests of managers with those of shareholders”
From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,543
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Self-citationMoral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. R. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,159
The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing
Ross, S. A. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90046-6 · Cited by 7,081
Holmstrom, B. R. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,928
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,113
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1992) · Hübner international series on risk, insurance, and economic security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,933
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
Grossman, S. J. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x · Cited by 1,427
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,314
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Self-citationDisclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Self-citationFinance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. E. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,778
The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330757 · Cited by 3,275
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 3,110
Metadata
- Authors
- Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-05
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1985909203
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 31.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
- Keywords
- managerial contracts, optimal contracts, security prices, equilibrium pricing, corporate governance, agency theory, risk sharing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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