The Loan Commitment as an Optimal Financing Contract
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper provides an imperfect information explanation for the existence of bank loan commitments when both the bank and the potential borrower are risk neutral. The borrower is assumed to have access to a two-stage investment project wherein the investment required in the second stage is not known at the outset. The unknown investment requirement is revealed to the borrower, but not to the bank, at the beginning of the second stage. If the investor borrows at the beginning of the first stage, the realization at the beginning of the second stage might prompt a default in a situation where the project yields positive net present value. The reason is that the borrower does not regard the first-stage investment as a sunk cost. We show that a two-stage contract resembling a loan commitment can solve this under-investment problem.
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Citations
Cites
Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments
Boot, A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90043-4 · Cited by 170
Commercial paper, bank reserve requirements, and the informational role of loan commitments
Kanatas, G. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90042-2 · Cited by 59
Cited by
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Sufi, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/revfin/hhm007 · Cited by 959
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ADMATI, A. R., & PFLEIDERER, P. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x · Cited by 723
Liquidity Management and Corporate Investment During a Financial Crisis
Campello, M., Giambona, E., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq131 · Cited by 656
Some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261851 · Cited by 550
Bank Market Power and SME Financing Constraints
Carbó-Valverde, S., Rodríguez-Fernández, F., & Udell, G. F. (2009) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfp003 · Cited by 377
Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information
BERGER, A. N., ESPINOSA‐VEGA, M. A., FRAME, W. S., & MILLER, N. H. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00820.x · Cited by 367
The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank Revolving Credit Agreements
Dennis, S., Nandy, D., & Sharpe, I. G. (2000) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2676240 · Cited by 346
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1998) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.1998.15 · Cited by 273
Liquidity Management and Corporate Investment During a Financial Crisis
Campello, M., Giambona, E., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1444009 · Cited by 216
The credit effects of monetary policy: Evidence using loan commitments
Morgan, D. P. (1998) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2601270 · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Berkovitch, E., & Greenbaum, S. I.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 83
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2068505366
- Cited by
- 89
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 12.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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