The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings
Abstract
Randolph P. Beatty, Edward J. Zajac, Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 313-335
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
The External Control of Organizations.
Benson, J. K., Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392573 · Cited by 4,945
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
The Long‐Run Performance of initial Public Offerings
RITTER, J. R. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03743.x · Cited by 3,300
Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models
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Cited by
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196729 · Cited by 3,213
Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::aid-smj950>3.0.co;2-k · Cited by 2,324
A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259103 · Cited by 1,591
Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory
Marquis, C., & Tilcsik, A. (2013) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2013.766076 · Cited by 1,576
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069408 · Cited by 1,312
Metadata
- Authors
- Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 313
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1274869024
- Cited by
- 974
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 63.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393238
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.