The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence
Abstract
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful criticisms and comments of Peter Cappelli, Glenn Carroll, Heather Haveman, David Levine, Brian Main, Trond Petersen, and the anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this manuscript and the Institute of Industrial Relations and the Center for Research in Management for research support. Using an agency theory framework and data on 89 Fortune 500 firms, we assess whether the granting of golden parachutes to chief executive officers is the result of an economically rational process or determined by the social influence of the CEO. While increased takeover risk is associated with a higher incidence of GPs, as predicted by economic theory, CEOs who are able to appoint more outsiders to their board are also more likely to have GPs. These results suggest that both economic and social influence perspectives have merit and that the importance of each may depend on the ownership structure of the fi rm.-
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wade, J., O'Reilly, C. A., & Chandratat, I.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-12
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 587
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2064126333
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 22.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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