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Cited by 676

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency Theory Perspective

Tosi, Henry L., Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.·1989·Administrative Science Quarterly

Abstract

It is common to thank the anonymous reviewers of a paper. In this case, we want them to know that they added in a very significant way to this study. Their comments provided helpful guidance that made a nice study a much better article. Their comments helped both of us learn a great deal about a theoretical domain with which we were unfamiliar. The way they dealt with this project could well be a tutorial for everyone who serves as a reviewer. This paper examines the extent to which monitoring and incentive alignment of Chief Executive (CEO) compensation and influence patterns of various actors on CEO pay vary as a function of ownership distribution within the firm. Based on the reports of 175 chief compensation officers in manufacturing, it was found that the level of monitoring and incentive alignment was greater in owner-controlled than management-controlled firms. For both types of firms, there was a direct relationship between monitoring and the risk level to the CEO of annual bonuses and long-term income, although the relationship was stronger among owner-controlled firms. In the owner-controlled firms, there was more influence over CEO pay by major stockholders and boards of directors. In management-controlled firms, the CEO pay influence was separated from major stockholders and boards. The results suggest that a behavioral approach to measuring agency theory concepts can provide some new insights into the process used to determine CEO pay.'

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Metadata

Authors
Tosi, H. L., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.
Venue
Administrative Science Quarterly
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1989-06
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
169
ISSN
0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2330257213
Cited by
676
References
27
FWCI
45.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency Theory Perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2989894
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Tosi, H. L., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1989). The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency Theory Perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2989894

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