The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from Management
Open accessAbstract
This paper presents a model that incorporates the behavior of chief executive officers (CEOs) into an explanation of how boards of directors affect organizational outcomes. Hypotheses are tested with archival data on corporate strategy, CEO compensation, board structure, and demographics, together with data from an original survey of both CEOs and outside directors from 221 large- and medium-sized U.S. corporations. The findings indicate that(1) changes in board structure that increase the board's independence from management are associated with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward board members, and (2) such influence behaviors, in turn, serve to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO compensation policy. Implications for theory and research on CEO-board power and effectiveness and the larger literature on power and influence are discussed.
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Cites
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The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
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Work Group Demography, Social Integration, and Turnover
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Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes
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Fredrickson, J. W., Hambrick, D. C., & Baumrin, S. (1988) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258576 · Cited by 538
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Cited by
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196772 · Cited by 1,607
The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation *
Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr049 · Cited by 1,589
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069408 · Cited by 1,312
Self-citationBoard Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4131472 · Cited by 1,154
The Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing Effect in Management
Pierce, J. R., & Aguinis, H. (2013) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311410060 · Cited by 1,085
Metadata
- Authors
- Westphal, J. D.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1998-09
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 511
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1968797226
- Cited by
- 430
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 23.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.