The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
Abstract
The authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller's product. Improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high-value buyers. However, improved information can also provide rents to buyers. In a variety of settings, this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes: either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Citations
Cites
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Maskin, E., & Riley, J. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555674 · Cited by 1,140
Blackwell, D. (1951) · Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability · doi:10.1525/9780520411586-009 · Cited by 1,024
The Economics of Price Discrimination
Phlips, L. (1983) · Cited by 373
Webster, F. E. (1984) · Cited by 360
Quality Testing and Disclosure
Matthews, S., & Postlewaite, A. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555561 · Cited by 238
Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements
Schmalense, R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003566 · Cited by 174
Segmenting the market: The monopolist's optimal product mix
Gabszewicz, J. J., Shaked, A., Sutton, J. D., & Thisse, J. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90046-3 · Cited by 122
Cited by
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 · Cited by 1,903
The economic analysis of advertising
Bagwell, K. W. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.7916/d8qz2p6x · Cited by 648
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
Johnson, J. P., & Myatt, D. P. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.756 · Cited by 631
Optimal Information Disclosure
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657922 · Cited by 484
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, T. R., & Sappington, D. E. M.
- Venue
- International Economic Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-05
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 309
- ISSN
- 0020-6598 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056141923
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 3.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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