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Quality Testing and Disclosure
Abstract
Sellers are often more able than consumers to test product quality. We show that whether such firms will voluntarily test quality and disclose what they learn depends in a paradoxical way upon the presence of mandatory disclosure rules: only if disclosure is mandatory will a seller not test and disclose. We than ask whether it is even desirable for consumers to be informed about the quality at the time they purchase. We show that if information about product quality can be obtained only after production decisions have been made, and if income effects are negligible, then consumers and firms will agree that a regime in which consumers are uninformed (informed) is preferable to a regime in which they are informed (uninformed) if income and quality are complements (substitutes) in utility. Consumers and firms can disagree -- in either way -- about which regime is better if income effects are not negligible. We conclude by discussing the desirability of mandatory testing laws.
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Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
Lewis, T. R., & Sappington, D. E. M. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527055 · Cited by 376
Strategic Information Revelation
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297541 · Cited by 338
Self-citationMandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers
Fishman, M. J. (2003) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/19.1.45 · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Matthews, S., & Postlewaite, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1985
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 328
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993942644
- Cited by
- 238
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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