The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion
Abstract
In a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents. In this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents, name output prices, and choose compensation schemes. We exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables -- not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents, but prices as well -- are selected perfectly cooperatively. This cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive: each firm sets the collusive output price, and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent. Although each firm has the ability to condition compensation on the agent's action (as well as on sales), firms choose to forego this opportunity. In essence, common agency provides an indirect mechanism through which competing firms may "sell out" to a single party, thereby creating incentives which generate a collusive outcome.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
Wilson, C. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7 · Cited by 1,035
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
Mookherjee, D. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297432 · Cited by 506
The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets
Miyazaki, H. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003294 · Cited by 407
Cited by
Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O. C. (1992) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299205600301 · Cited by 1,105
Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230 · Cited by 1,082
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1985
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2014326283
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 7.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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