The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
Abstract
The Grossman-Hart principal-agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting. Under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as Nash equilibria, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts, of rank-order tournaments, and for attainability of the first-best. In this context the relation of the principal's welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated. Finally, some problems with the Nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Contributions to the theory of games.
(1960) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(60)90366-5 · Cited by 1,824
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261153 · Cited by 983
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Aumann, R. J. (1959) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV · doi:10.1515/9781400882168-018 · Cited by 886
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
Lafontaine, F. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555988 · Cited by 1,118
Che, Y.-K., & Yoo, S.-W. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.525 · Cited by 542
A survey of agency models of organizations
Levinthal, D. (1988) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(88)90071-6 · Cited by 370
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
Meyer, M. A., & Vickers, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262082 · Cited by 340
Metadata
- Authors
- Mookherjee, D.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 433
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047301074
- Cited by
- 506
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297432
- The paper
- Mookherjee, D. (1984). Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297432
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
