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Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies
Abstract
This article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and, therefore, may be a profit-maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost. In the model buyers care about price and quality, sellers can contract on price but not on quality, and a single supplier has monopoly power. Licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm. As a result, licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost. Some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry.
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Citations
Cited by
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Chapter 18 Empirical studies of innovation and market structure
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Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics
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The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T. (2000) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00114 · Cited by 545
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Gallini, N. T., & Wright, B. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555500 · Cited by 487
Licensing the market for technology
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Chapter 2 The theory of the firm
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The market for patents in Europe
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The dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shepard, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 360
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2006144790
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.