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Cited by 475

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts

Murphy, Kevin J.·1986·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

This article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses: incentives, in which productivity depends on unobservable effort, and learning, in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time. Shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experience-earnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance. I empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1, 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974-1985. The data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis.

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Metadata

Authors
Murphy, K. J.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1986
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
59
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2028246502
Cited by
475
References
16
FWCI
9.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555628
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Murphy, K. J. (1986). Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555628

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.