The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach
Abstract
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65% efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single-dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer-assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Optimization by Simulated Annealing
Kirkpatrick, S., Gelatt, C. D., & Vecchi, M. P. (1983) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.220.4598.671 · Cited by 45,134
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
The Use of Knowledge in Society
HAYEK, F. (1996) · Knowledge Management and Organisational Design · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-9749-1.50005-3 · Cited by 6,434
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Nonparametrics: Statistical Methods Based on Ranks
Mergenthaler, M. J., & Lehmann, E. L. (1979) · Technometrics · doi:10.2307/1268531 · Cited by 3,329
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Baudier, E., & Debreu, G. (1959) · Cited by 2,545
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
Koopmans, T. C., & Beckmann, M. (1957) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907742 · Cited by 2,308
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium
Harrell, C., & Debreu, G. (1960) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055180 · Cited by 1,774
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.018 · Cited by 1,418
Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.008 · Cited by 1,123
Sequencing and Scheduling: An Introduction to the Mathematics of the Job-Shop
Rand, G. K., & French, S. D. (1982) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/jors.1982.184 · Cited by 1,047
A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation
Rassenti, S., & Bulfin, R. L. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.035 · Cited by 583
Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics
Plott, C. R. (2001) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781035304356.00008 · Cited by 474
Research in experimental economics
(2013) · Experiments in Financial Economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2013)0000016009 · Cited by 424
Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions
Cox, J. C., & Roberson, B. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.031 · Cited by 395
Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization
Chao, H., & Wilson, R. B. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 244
A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1981) · American Economic Review · Cited by 221
The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors
Grether, D. M., Isaac, R. M., & Plott, C. R. (1980) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/gtfvh-jdq64 · Cited by 76
Complete information outcomes without common knowledge
Daughety, A. F., & Forsythe, R. S. (1988) · Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge · Cited by 4
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Self-citationComputationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Rothkopf, M. H., Pekeč, A., & Harstad, R. M. (1998) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1131 · Cited by 1,024
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
de Vries, S., & Vohra, R. V. (2003) · INFORMS Journal on Computing · doi:10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077 · Cited by 985
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.1.159 · Cited by 530
Metadata
- Authors
- Banks, J. S., Ledyard, J. O., & Porter, D. P.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2105631488
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 2.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.