The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger
Open accessAbstract
The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input prices and profits are affected by the structures of the upstream and the downstream industries, by the demand relations among the final products, and by the nature of the bargaining between the suppliers and firms. The implications for the incentives for merger turn out to be significantly different from what they would be in an alternative environment where prices are not determined in bargaining.
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261312 · Cited by 2,523
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,511
Self-citation
Cited by
The Importance of Industry Links in Merger Waves
AHERN, K. R., & HARFORD, J. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12122 · Cited by 492
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
Crawford, G. S., & Yurukoglu, A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.643 · Cited by 448
Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry
Gowrisankaran, G., Nevo, A., & Town, R. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130223 · Cited by 393
Marx, L. M., & Shaffer, G. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464588 · Cited by 353
The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets
Gaynor, M., Ho, K., & Town, R. J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.2.235 · Cited by 349
Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices
Dobson, P. W., & Waterson, M. (1997) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00167 · Cited by 332
Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
Grennan, M. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.145 · Cited by 323
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries
Inderst, R., & Wey, C. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3087440 · Cited by 252
Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Party Tariff Negotiations
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R., & Yurukoglu, A. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24273 · Cited by 28
The role of market concentration in the agrifood industry
Hernandez, M. A., Espinoza, A., Berrospi, M. L., Deconinck, K., Swinnen, J., & Vos, R. (2023) · doi:10.2499/p15738coll2.136567 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Horn, H., & Wolinsky, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 408
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2002955697
- Cited by
- 725
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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