The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts
Open accessAbstract
Venture capitalists often hold extensive control rights over entrepreneurial companies, including the right to fire entrepreneurs. This article examines why, and under what circumstances, entrepreneurs would voluntarily relinquish control. Control rights protect the venture capitalists from hold-up by the entrepreneurs. This provides the correct incentives for the venture capitalists to search for a superior management team. Wealth-constrained entrepreneurs may give up control even if the change in management imposes a greater loss of private benefit to them than a monetary gain to the company. The model also explains why entrepreneurs accept vesting of their stock and low severance.
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Cites
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Cited by
Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start‐Up Firms: Empirical Evidence
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00419 · Cited by 2,425
Self-citationThe Venture Capital Revolution
Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.145 · Cited by 1,934
Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments
Sorenson, O., & Stuart, T. E. (2001) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/321301 · Cited by 1,925
The Financing of R&D and Innovation
Hall, B. H., & Lerner, J. (2010) · Handbook of the Economics of Innovation · doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)01014-2 · Cited by 1,711
Social Networks and Entrepreneurship
Greve, A., & Salaff, J. W. (2003) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/1540-8520.00029 · Cited by 1,598
Metadata
- Authors
- Hellmann, T.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079685316
- Cited by
- 705
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 77.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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