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Cited by 328

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game

Erard, Brian, Feinstein, Jonathan S.·1994·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

Conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports, underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded. In contrast to this view, considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest, reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat. In this article we build a game-theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers. We show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model, leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications.

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Metadata

Authors
Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. S.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1994
Volume
25
Issue
1
Pages
1
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2046359676
Cited by
328
References
1
FWCI
10.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555850
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Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. S. (1994). Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555850

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