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Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
Open accessAbstract
This article Presents a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness. I show that in the presence of transactions costs, incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal's type. Two types of transactions costs are considered: those incurred ex ante (drafting costs) and those incurred ex post (enforcement or verification costs). I prove that in the presence of either of these costs, asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does.
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Citations
Cites
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Cited by
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Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
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Ho, B., & Liu, E. (2011) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-011-9126-0 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Spier, K. E.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 432
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047314199
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Spier, K. E. (1992). Incomplete Contracts and Signalling. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555872
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
