The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
Open accessAbstract
This article Presents a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness. I show that in the presence of transactions costs, incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal's type. Two types of transactions costs are considered: those incurred ex ante (drafting costs) and those incurred ex post (enforcement or verification costs). I prove that in the presence of either of these costs, asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does.
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Cites
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
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Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution
Cooter, R. D., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1989) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 672
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
Maskin, E. S., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951674 · Cited by 475
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
Myerson, R. B. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912116 · Cited by 434
Imperfect Information, Credit Markets, and Unemployment
Stiglitz, J. E., & Greenwald, B. C. N. (1987) · European Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8ff439b · Cited by 121
Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (1992) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213250 · Cited by 108
Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation
Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. M. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 106
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Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 · Cited by 1,040
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust
Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3094850 · Cited by 666
Metadata
- Authors
- Spier, K. E.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 432
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047314199
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 22.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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