The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks
Open accessAbstract
We study monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We consider two sorts of goods: those with an active secondhand market and anonymous consumers, such as textbooks, and those with no secondhand market and consumers who can prove that they purchased the old good to qualify for a discount on the new one, such as software. In the first case we show that the monopolist may choose to either produce or repurchase the old good once the new one becomes available. In the latter case we determine when the monopolist chooses to offer upgrade discounts.
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Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
Conditioning prices on purchase history
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Benjaafar, S., Kong, G., Li, X., & Courcoubetis, C. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2970 · Cited by 455
Collaborative Consumption: Strategic and Economic Implications of Product Sharing
Jiang, B., & Tian, L. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2647 · Cited by 408
Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 235
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2052349846
- Cited by
- 309
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 12.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.