The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement
Abstract
This article examines the incentives of contractual parties to design agreements that are left intentionally incomplete with regard to future duties or contingencies. More complete contracts mitigate ex post opportunism and the associated distortions in unobservable investment, but at the cost of additional resources expended in ex ante design. The optimal degree of contractual incompleteness involves a tradeoff between these opposing forces, the magnitudes of which may be predicted based on observable characteristics of the transactors and of the exchange environment. The resulting hypotheses are tested using panel data on the pricing procedures using in Air Force engine procurement contracts. We conclude that the degree of contractual completeness chosen in practice reflects a desire by the parties to minimize the economic costs associated with contractual exchange.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
(1985) · Cited by 7,244
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns
Hansen, L. P., & Singleton, K. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261141 · Cited by 1,547
Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets
Joskow, P. L. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,260
Regulation and Administered Contracts
Goldberg, V. P. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003265 · Cited by 752
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261372 · Cited by 334
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length
Crocker, K. J., & Masten, S. E. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555660 · Cited by 329
Self-citationPretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts
Crocker, K. J., & Masten, S. E. (1991) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467219 · Cited by 322
Self-citationEfficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas.
Masten, S. E., & Crocker, K. J. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 319
Self-citationPrinciples of Relational Contracts
Goetz, C. J., & Scott, R. E. (1981) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1072743 · Cited by 262
The Performance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets
Joskow, P. L. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555423 · Cited by 157
Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555732 · Cited by 145
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts
Muris, T. J. (1981) · Minnesota law review · doi:10.24926/265535.3343 · Cited by 110
Cited by
Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.64.4.36.18070 · Cited by 1,402
Krause, D. R., Handfield, R. B., & Tyler, B. B. (2007) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.007 · Cited by 1,191
Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696361 · Cited by 1,098
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment
(1995) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036875 · Cited by 987
Schepker, D. J., Oh, W.-Y., Martynov, A., & Poppo, L. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313491289 · Cited by 794
Metadata
- Authors
- Crocker, K. J., & Reynolds, K. J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 126
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044648126
- Cited by
- 568
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 20.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.