The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Procurement and Renegotiation
Open accessAbstract
Parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information. The issue of the parties' investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two-period procurement model. The firm invests in the first period. It then learns its production cost, and the sponsor learns its value for the project. Williamson's underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm's investment is not observable by the sponsor. The introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued. The role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed. Last, it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable, the two parties may choose to under- or overinvest.
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Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
Williamson, O. E. (1996) · The Mechanisms Of Governance · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195078244.003.0006 · Cited by 2,019
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.010 · Cited by 680
Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.31.5.835 · Cited by 618
A Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Self-citationSupply Chain Coordination with Contracts
Cachon, G. P. (2003) · Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7 · Cited by 2,683
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,206
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1986-04
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 235-259
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2005785293
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 30.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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