The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships
Abstract
Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradeoff. Risk aversion leads to compensation arrangements, which spread risk through greater sharing of revenues. We find that compensation arrangements with greater degrees of revenue sharing significantly reduce physician effort. The results imply that changing the method of physician payment from fee-for-service to capitation will dramatically reduce physician effort.
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Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
Cited by
Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215 · Cited by 2,469
Hamilton, B. H., Nickerson, J. A., & Owan, H. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/374182 · Cited by 981
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
(2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80168-7 · Cited by 430
Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives
Robinson, J. C. (2001) · The Milbank Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1468-0009.00202 · Cited by 418
Metadata
- Authors
- Gaynor, M., & Gertler, P.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1995
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 591
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2061881214
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.