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Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries
Open accessAbstract
I discuss the role of intermediaries that search out the information of privately informed parties and then choose what to reveal to uninformed parties. The focus is on the strategic manipulation of information by these certification intermediaries. I show that in a class of environments the optimal choice for a monopoly intermediary is to reveal only whether quality is above some minimal standard. Despite this minimal information transmission, the intermediary can capture a large share of the surplus. I also show that competition among the intermediaries can lead to full information revelation.
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Citations
Cites
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lizzeri, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 214
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2068624556
- Cited by
- 579
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 14.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.