The DOI matches its Crossref record; 145 of the 145 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Personnel selection as a signaling game.
Abstract
Personnel selection involves exchanges of information between job market actors (applicants and organizations). These actors do not have an incentive to exchange accurate information about their ability and commitment to the employment relationship unless it is to their advantage. This state of affairs explains numerous phenomena in personnel selection (e.g., faking). Signaling theory describes a mechanism by which parties with partly conflicting interests (and thus an incentive for deception) can nevertheless exchange accurate information. We apply signaling theory to personnel selection, distinguishing between adaptive relationships between applicants and organizations, among applicants, and among organizations. In each case, repeated adaptations and counteradaptations between actors can lead to situations of equilibrium or escalation (arms races). We show that viewing personnel selection as a network of adaptive relationships among job market actors enables an understanding of both classic and underexplored micro- and macro-level selection phenomena and their dynamic interactions.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bangerter, A., Roulin, N., & König, C. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Psychology
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 719-738
- ISSN
- 0021-9010 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1854
- OpenAlex
- W2101049208
- Cited by
- 309
- References
- 145
- FWCI
- 14.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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