The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intention and Weakness of Will
Abstract
There is something curious about the philosophical literature on weakness of will. It is not about what one might expect it to be about. Even David Wiggins, in a discussion that has much in common with that to be given here, starts by claiming Almost anyone not under the influence of theory will say that, when a person is weak-willed, he intentionally chooses that which he knows or believes to be the worse course of action when he could choose the better course.1 I do not agree that this is the untutored view. Whenever I have asked non-philosophers what they take weakness of will to consist in, they have said things like this: weak-willed people are irresolute; they don’t persist in their intentions; they are too easily deflected from the path that they have chosen. My aim in this paper is to pursue this line of thought. I shall develop the idea that the central cases of weakness of will are best characterized not as cases in which people act against their better judgement, but as cases in which they fail to act on their intentions. Of course, to say this is not to say enough. Not every case of a failure to act on one’s intentions is a case of weakness of will.
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Citations
Cites
Shackle, G. L. S., & Simon, H. A. (1959) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228083 · Cited by 3,558
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,384
Elster, J. (1979) · Cited by 926
Austin, J. L. (1971) · Philosophy and Linguistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15426-5_6 · Cited by 604
Harman, G. H. (1986) · Behaviorism · Cited by 542
Skepticism about Weakness of Will
Watson, G. (1977) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183785 · Cited by 386
Jeffrey, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025160 · Cited by 270
JACKSON, F. (1984) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xciii.369.1 · Cited by 184
Mele, A. R. (1992) · Cited by 174
Where does the akratic break take place?
Rorty, A. O. (1980) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408012341341 · Cited by 166
Cited by
Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays
Watson, G. (2004) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001 · Cited by 480
Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion
Smith, M. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0002 · Cited by 303
Weatherson, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 · Cited by 302
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
(2003) · doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001 · Cited by 285
Akrasia, Collective and Individual
Pettit, P. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0004 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Holton, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999-05
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 241
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2520717453
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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