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Skepticism about Weakness of Will

Watson, Gary · 1977 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

A Though it occurs with deplorable frequency, weakness of will has seemed to many philosophers hard to understand. The motivation of weak behavior' is generally familiar and intelligible enough: the desire to remain in bed, or the desire for another drink are ordinary examples. Nevertheless, our common ways of describing and explaining this phenomenon have been thought to involve serious difficulties. These descriptions and explanations can, upon reflection, seem incoherent. Accordingly, weakness of will has given rise to various forms of skepticism. The most notorious form is socratism, which denies the possibility of such behavior. Another form of skepticism admits its possibility but casts doubt upon a complex of distinctions and moral attitudes involved in the common view. Briefly, it argues that no one who acts contrary to his or her better judgment does so freely, that weakness of will cannot be significantly distinguished from psychological compulsion', and that therefore certain moral distinctions implicit in the common view cannot be justified. My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to soc-

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Metadata

Authors
Watson, G.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1977-07
Volume
86
Issue
3
Pages
316
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2157726074
Cited by
386
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Skepticism about Weakness of Will. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2183785
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Watson, G. (1977). Skepticism about Weakness of Will. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183785

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