The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.
Abstract
Assesses the relationship between boards of directors, compensation committees and top management pay, focusing on the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the structure of boards of directors to explain variations in top management pay in the UK. Uses data from the 'Financial Times' top 100 companies to examine the relationship between: top management compensation, non-executive directors and corporate performance; top management compensation, existence of compensation committees and proportion of non-executives on these committees; and the relationship between top management compensation and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. Finds that, in general, boardroom control and vigilance has a limited effect in shaping top management compensation, neither the proportion of outside directors, nor CEO duality being related to management compensation; and companies adopting compensation committees have higher levels of top management pay. Demonstrates that the direct effect of boardroom control variables on the level of management compensation is minimal.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Baltagi, B. H. (2021) · Springer Texts in Business and Economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5 · Cited by 15,104
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Hsiao, C. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781009057745 · Cited by 7,869
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Cited by
Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview
Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008) · Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal · doi:10.1108/09513570810907401 · Cited by 538
The Principal's Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and the Specification of Objectives
Hendry, J. (2002) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/4134371 · Cited by 361
The Heterogeneity of Board-Level Sustainability Committees and Corporate Social Performance
Burke, J. J., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2019) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3453-2 · Cited by 292
Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis
Iwasaki, I., Ma, X., & Mizobata, S. (2020) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105928 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1998-04-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 146-157
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2089740740
- Cited by
- 734
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 57.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/257099
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
