The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.
Abstract
Assesses the relationship between boards of directors, compensation committees and top management pay, focusing on the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the structure of boards of directors to explain variations in top management pay in the UK. Uses data from the 'Financial Times' top 100 companies to examine the relationship between: top management compensation, non-executive directors and corporate performance; top management compensation, existence of compensation committees and proportion of non-executives on these committees; and the relationship between top management compensation and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. Finds that, in general, boardroom control and vigilance has a limited effect in shaping top management compensation, neither the proportion of outside directors, nor CEO duality being related to management compensation; and companies adopting compensation committees have higher levels of top management pay. Demonstrates that the direct effect of boardroom control variables on the level of management compensation is minimal.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Baltagi, B. H. (2021) · Springer Texts in Business and Economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5 · Cited by 15,104
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Hsiao, C. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781009057745 · Cited by 7,869
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance
Lipton, M. J., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992) · The Business lawyer/The business lawyer · Cited by 2,735
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting
Williamson, O. E. (2007) · Das Summa Summarum des Management · doi:10.1007/978-3-8349-9320-5_6 · Cited by 2,440
The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm
Demsetz, H. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467041 · Cited by 2,342
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
Murphy, K. J. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6 · Cited by 1,755
The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258106 · Cited by 1,418
Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications
Hart, O. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235027 · Cited by 1,254
Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393700 · Cited by 1,231
Pawns or Potentates: the reality of America's corporate boards
Lorsch, J., & Young, J. (1990) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.1990.4277214 · Cited by 1,215
Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J. (1994) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393238 · Cited by 974
BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE IMPACT OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE.
DAILY, C. M., & DALTON, D. R. (1994) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256801 · Cited by 860
Board control and ceo compensation
Boyd, B. K. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150502 · Cited by 820
Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' Long-Term Incentive Plans
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1994) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393295 · Cited by 775
Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1989) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250100203 · Cited by 733
CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories
III, C. A. O., Main, B. G., & Crystal, G. S. (1988) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393058 · Cited by 695
The Structure of Organizational Incentives
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K. (1993) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393375 · Cited by 609
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150909 · Cited by 564
HUSELID, M. A., & BECKER, B. E. (1996) · Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1468-232x.1996.tb00413.x · Cited by 533
MANAGERIAL CONTROL, PERFORMANCE, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Tosi, H., & Hinkin, T. (1987) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/255895 · Cited by 509
Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries
Leighton, D. S. R., & Garven, G. (1996) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.1996.46 · Cited by 505
Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1995) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393639 · Cited by 489
CEO TENURE AS A DETERMINANT OF CEO PAY.
Hill, C. W. L., & Phan, P. (1991) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256413 · Cited by 448
Zajac, E. J. (1990) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250110304 · Cited by 436
EFFECTS OF BOARD DEMOGRAPHY AND DIRECTORS' INCENTIVES ON CORPORATE GREENMAIL DECISIONS.
Kosnik, R. D. (1990) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256355 · Cited by 435
In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives
Crystal, G. S. (1991) · Cited by 394
Matching compensation and organizational strategies
Balkin, D. B., & Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. (1990) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250110207 · Cited by 365
The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises
Hambrick, D. C., & Finkelstein, S. (1995) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250160304 · Cited by 360
TOSI, H. L., KATZ, J. P., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257054 · Cited by 347
INFORMATION-PROCESSING DEMANDS AS A DETERMINANT OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Henderson, A. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (1996) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256656 · Cited by 343
Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1988) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250090603 · Cited by 336
(1990) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/0024-6301(90)90335-2 · Cited by 288
Managerial control and performance
McEachern, W. (1975) · Cited by 252
CEO COMPENSATION MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE.
TOSI, Jr., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. (1994) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256609 · Cited by 244
The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives
MAIN, B. G. M., O'REILLY, C. A., & WADE, J. (1995) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/4.2.293 · Cited by 224
Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance
Main, B. G. M., & Johnston, J. (1993) · Accounting and Business Research · doi:10.1080/00014788.1993.9729903 · Cited by 183
Top management tenure, corporate ownership structure and the magnitude of golden parachutes
Singh, H., & Harianto, F. (1989) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250100711 · Cited by 126
Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation, and Firm PerformancePreprint
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1997) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 120
Guasch, J. L., & Hahn, R. W. (1997) · Cited by 106
BOARD GOVERNANCE AS A DETERMINANT OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996) · Academy of Management Proceedings · doi:10.5465/ambpp.1996.4978052 · Cited by 8
Cited by
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196729 · Cited by 3,213
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.1.82 · Cited by 1,830
Environmental Performance and Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective
Berrone, P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.36461950 · Cited by 1,234
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00318 · Cited by 1,087
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
Metadata
- Authors
- Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1998-04-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 146-157
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2089740740
- Cited by
- 734
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 57.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.