The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Condorcet's Theory of Voting
Abstract
Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely ranking of the alternatives. This procedure, which is sometimes known as “Kemeny's rule,” is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independence of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.
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Cites
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Shackle, G. L. S., & Arrow, K. J. (1951) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2549613 · Cited by 7,792
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix
Condorcet, N. D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139923972 · Cited by 1,417
Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation
Hellman, G. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0198240341.001.0001 · Cited by 1,158
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Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
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Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences
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Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective
Grofman, B., & Feld, S. L. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957401 · Cited by 462
A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
Young, H. P., & Levenglick, A. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135023 · Cited by 455
Self-citation
Cited by
Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide
OECD, Union, E., & Joint Research Centre - European Commission (2008) · doi:10.1787/9789264043466-en · Cited by 3,960
Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide
Nardo, M., Saisana, M., Saltelli, A., Tarantola, S., Hoffmann, A., & Giovannini, E. (2005) · OECD Statistics Working Papers · doi:10.1787/533411815016 · Cited by 2,671
Greco, S., Ishizaka, A., Tasiou, M., & Torrisi, G. (2019) · Social Indicators Research · doi:10.1007/s11205-017-1832-9 · Cited by 1,325
“A large amount of work has been carried out with the aim of providing solutions to this issue (Kemeny 1959; Young and Levenglick 1978; Young 1988).”
BackgroundBayesian Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., Dahleh, M. A., Lobel, I., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr004 · Cited by 754
The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions.
Hastie, R., & Kameda, T. (2005) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.112.2.494 · Cited by 462
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-12
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1231-1244
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2140897975
- Cited by
- 746
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 8.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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