The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions
Abstract
We examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to determine which cases to review. In our game theoretic model, a higher court cues from publicly observable case facts, the known preferences of a lower court, and its decision. The lower court attempts to enforce its own preferences, exploiting ambiguity in cases' fact patterns. In equilibrium, a conservative higher court declines to review conservative decisions from lower courts regardless of the facts of the case or the relative ideology of the judges. But a conservative higher court probabilistically reviews liberal decisions, with the “audit rate” tied, to observable facts and the ideology of the lower court judge. We derive comparative static results and test them with a random sample of search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger Court between 1972 and 1986. The evidence broadly supports the model.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
Cleveland, W. S. (1993) · Cited by 1,698
Epstein, L., & Knight, D. J. (1997) · Cited by 1,307
The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Based Samples
Manski, C. F., & Lerman, S. R. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914121 · Cited by 1,208
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Spaeth, H. J., & Segal, J. A. (1993) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,077
Self-citationLog-concave probability and its applications
Bagnoli, M., & Bergstrom, T. (2006) · Studies in Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-29578-x_11 · Cited by 963
The Logic of Images in International Relations.
Angell, R. C., & Jervis, R. (1972) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576152 · Cited by 704
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
Farrell, J. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1029 · Cited by 507
The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130895 · Cited by 475
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court
Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961752 · Cited by 439
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning
Becker, W. G., Perry, C. M., Rheinstein, M., & Levi, E. H. (1951) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1597693 · Cited by 400
Songer, D. R., Segal, J. A., & Cameron, C. M. (1994) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111602 · Cited by 365
Self-citationPredicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981
Segal, J. A. (1984) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955796 · Cited by 362
Self-citationThe Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Banks, J. S., & Weingast, B. R. (1992) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111488 · Cited by 270
Beyond Linearity by Default: Generalized Additive Models
Beck, N., & Jackman, S. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991772 · Cited by 212
The American courts : a critical assessment
Gates, J. B., & Johnson, C. A. (1991) · CQ Press eBooks · Cited by 158
Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine
Kornhauser, L. A. (1992) · Cited by 156
Signalling Games in Political Science
Banks, J. T. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315014777 · Cited by 141
Tate, C. N., & Handberg, R. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111371 · Cited by 120
Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior.
Schwartz, R. D., & Schubert, G. A., Jr. (1960) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2090006 · Cited by 114
Signaling Games in Political Science
Banks (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203065990 · Cited by 97
Cited by
Log-concave probability and its applications
Bagnoli, M., & Bergstrom, T. (2006) · Studies in Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-29578-x_11 · Cited by 963
Epstein, L., Martin, A. D., Segal, J. A., & Westerland, C. (2007) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm024 · Cited by 400
Self-citationFarhang, S. (2004) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewh035 · Cited by 284
Metadata
- Authors
- Cameron, C. M., Segal, J. A., & Songer, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-03-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101-116
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2124704835
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 43.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.