The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
Abstract
This article examines how reelection incentives influence foreign policy decision making in democratic states. A formal model characterizes how future electoral prospects affect a government's decision to undertake adventurous foreign policies. When governments are assured of reelection, they make unbiased decisions considering only international factors. Decision making is similarly unbiased when governments have no prospects of reelection. When the voters' evaluation of foreign policy outcomes could have an effect on election results then governments are biased towards violent, adventurous foreign policy projects. Institutional constraints are shown to reduce the magnitude of these biases. The bias in foreign policy decisions at the end of the electoral cycle influences decision making in other countries. As a nation approaches the end of its electoral cycle other nations are more conciliatory and less confrontational towards it. With endogenous crisis formation, the model provides an explanation for the empirical phenomenon that democracies are more likely to become involved in war early in their electoral term.
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Cites
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Cited by
Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551398 · Cited by 1,108
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586113 · Cited by 1,044
Self-citationStrongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict
WEEKS, J. L. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000111 · Cited by 513
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Self-citationThe Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Huth, P. K., & Allee, T. L. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491405 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, A.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-03
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 133
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010616166
- Cited by
- 457
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 63.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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