The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
Open accessAbstract
The players in most economically important games are agents, not principals. This raises the possibility of the principal's setting a strategic compensation scheme. The central question addressed here is whether unobservable agency contracts can serve as precommitments. I argue that, in terms of Nash equilibrium outcomes, the answer is no when it is common knowledge that there exists a contract that "solves" the standard agency problems and that the principal and agent have the same preferences over income and effort. However, I also show that when these conditions are not satisfied (as they typically will not be), provisions of the agency contract enacted solely to deal with incentive and risk sharing problems of the agency relationship may have the secondary effect of credibly precommitting the agent in the game he plays with other agents. I also briefly consider the effects of contract renegotiation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00180 · Cited by 733
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261999 · Cited by 689
Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1826 · Cited by 385
Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure
Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03033-0 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Katz, M. L.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 307
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2152610678
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2601049
- The paper
- Katz, M. L. (1991). Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2601049
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.