The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions
Abstract
Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is wrong to be envious. These two senses of 'appropriate' have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy.
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Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton Readings in Political Thought · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,631
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
Gibbard, A. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001 · Cited by 2,619
Izard, C. E. (1991) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-0615-1 · Cited by 1,783
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Dispositional Theories of Value
Smith, M., Lewis, D., & Johnston, M. (1989) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/63.1.89 · Cited by 1,030
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?
McDowell, J., & McFetridge, I. G. (1978) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/52.1.13 · Cited by 921
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer
Firth, R. (1952) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103988 · Cited by 808
The Philosophy of laughter and humor
Morreall, J. (1987) · State University of New York Press eBooks · Cited by 613
Roberts, R. C. (1988) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185261 · Cited by 528
Cited by
The Case for Rage: Why Anger Is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle
Cherry, M. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197557341.001.0001 · Cited by 269
Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness
ALLAIS, L. (2008) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00123.x · Cited by 258
Akrasia, Collective and Individual
Pettit, P. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0004 · Cited by 32
The Moral Psychological Justification of Anger: An Exploration of Self-Respect and Recognition
Zhang, J., Xiong, Z., Zheng, H., & Ma, X. (2024) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15010003 · Cited by 9
Betrayed Expectations: Misdirected Anger and the Preservation of Ideology
Emerick, B., & Yap, A. (2023) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v24i3.1615 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- D'Arms, J., & Jacobson, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 65
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044608255
- Cited by
- 1,068
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 80.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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