The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines how the place of banks in the intercorporate network has changed as a result of their decreasing role as financial intermediaries in the U.S. economy. An analysis of comprehensive data on the boards of the fifty largest banks and their connections with the several hundred largest nonbank corporations from 1982 to 1994 shows that the centrality of banks has significantly declined as executives of major corporations, particularly those representing central firms, joined bank boards at a substantially lower rate. Declining centrality reflects a strategic choice on the part of the banks: as the returns available from lending to major corporations have declined, the largest banks have moved into other forms of business and reduced their recruiting of centrally located directors. We conclude with a discussion of the role of financial intermediation in shaping the social organization of the economy.
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Cited by
Uzzi, B. (1999) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312249906400402 · Cited by 1,937
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196772 · Cited by 1,607
Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., & Cannella, A. A. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2007.26279222 · Cited by 1,312
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures
Certo, S. T. (2003) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/30040731 · Cited by 1,147
Effects of missing data in social networks
Kossinets, G. (2006) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2005.07.002 · Cited by 926
Metadata
- Authors
- Davis, G. F., & Mizruchi, M. S.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 215-239
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W2146700771
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 52.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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