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Challengers, Elites, and Owning Families: A Social Class Theory of Corporate Acquisitions in the 1960s
Abstract
This paper analyzes data on 461 large U.S. industrial corporations to determine the factors that led large firms to participate in the wave of diversifying acquisitions that peaked in the late 1960s. We elaborate and test a class theory of corporate acquisitions, maintaining that firms pursued acquisitions in this period when they were commanded by well-networked challengers who were central in elite social networks but relatively marginal with respect to social status, isolated from the resistance of established elites, and free from control of owning families. We also consider a wide range of factors highlighted by alternative accounts of acquisition likelihood, including resource dependence, institutional pressures, and principal-agent conflicts. The results provide support for our main theoretical arguments, even when controls related to alternative explanations are taken into account.
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Capital: A Critique of Political Economy
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Cited by
Resource Dependence Theory: A Review
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206309343469 · Cited by 3,178
Completing the Practice Turn in Strategy Research
Whittington, R. (2006) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840606064101 · Cited by 1,972
Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory
Marquis, C., & Tilcsik, A. (2013) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2013.766076 · Cited by 1,576
Corporate Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family–Controlled Firms
Carney, M. (2005) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00081.x · Cited by 1,508
Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00063.x · Cited by 1,300
Metadata
- Authors
- Palmer, D., & Barber, B. M.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-120
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W1967870427
- Cited by
- 395
- References
- 90
- FWCI
- 33.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
