The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
Open accessAbstract
The paper develops an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics and shows the following: (1) the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. (2) The threat of producer protection leads to low-powered incentive schemes for regulated firms. (3) Consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm. (4) An interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation, where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal (Congress).
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
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Self-citationThe congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
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The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Self-citationSeize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.006 · Cited by 702
Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature
Santos, J. A. C. (2001) · Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments · doi:10.1111/1468-0416.00042 · Cited by 569
Networks in transition: how industry events (re)shape interfirm relationships
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Dorobantu, S., Kaul, A., & Zelner, B. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2590 · Cited by 441
When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations
Rodrik, D. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.1.189 · Cited by 432
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate
Shirley, M., & Walsh, P. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2420 · Cited by 378
The impact of standards and regulation on innovation in uncertain markets
Blind, K., Petersen, S. S., & Riillo, C. A. F. (2017) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2016.11.003 · Cited by 366
Corporate cooptation of organic and fair trade standards
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Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence
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Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy
GORDON, S. C., & HAFER, C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051634 · Cited by 281
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556079 · Cited by 274
Self-citationGuriev, S. (2004) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.06.001 · Cited by 269
The Wizards of Oz: Towards an Institutional Approach to Elites, Expertise and Command Posts
Zald, M. N., & Lounsbury, M. (2010) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840610373201 · Cited by 258
The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture
Francis, M. M. (2019) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.1111/lasr.12384 · Cited by 103
Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Tungodden, B. (2003) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(03)00089-5 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-11-01
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1089-1127
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2099416858
- Cited by
- 1,155
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 22.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.