The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Abstract
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, the authors distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
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Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253302 · Cited by 849
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance
Feigenberg, B., Field, E., & Pande, R. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt016 · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-11
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1713
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121068993
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D. (1991). Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938286
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