The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Abstract
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, the authors distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Self-citationThe Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Maskin, E. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951505 · Cited by 767
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1 · Cited by 665
Self-citationOn Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297484 · Cited by 637
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Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-o · Cited by 483
Self-citationMonitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Radner, R. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912747 · Cited by 405
Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
Porter, R. H. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90050-9 · Cited by 282
Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (1994) · Essays in Game Theory · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_1 · Cited by 187
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
Radner, R., Myerson, R., & Maskin, E. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297591 · Cited by 167
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete InformationPreprint
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Maskin, E. S. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 115
An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident
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The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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Cited by
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253302 · Cited by 849
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Maskin, E. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951505 · Cited by 767
A Prisoner's Dilemma Approach to Entrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationships
Cable, D. M., & Shane, S. (1997) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259227 · Cited by 415
Metadata
- Authors
- Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-11
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1713
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121068993
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 5.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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