The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
Each of n players, in an infinitely repeated game, starts with subjective beliefs about his opponents' strategies. If the individual beliefs are compatible with the true strategies chose, then Bayesian updating will lead in the long run to accurate prediction of the future of play of the game. It follows that individual players, who know their own payoff matrices and choose strategies to maximize their expected utility, must eventually play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. An immediate corollary is that, when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information about opponents' payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the real game, as if they had complete information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game
Robinson, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969530 · Cited by 868
Cited by
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Cesa-Bianchi, N., & Lugosi, G. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546921 · Cited by 3,162
Economic Analysis of Social Interactions
Manski, C. F. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.115 · Cited by 2,064
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change
GREIF, A., & LAITIN, D. D. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404041395 · Cited by 1,096
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Metadata
- Authors
- Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1019
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2097540415
- Cited by
- 697
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2951492
- The paper
- Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E. (1993). Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951492
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.