The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
Each of n players, in an infinitely repeated game, starts with subjective beliefs about his opponents' strategies. If the individual beliefs are compatible with the true strategies chose, then Bayesian updating will lead in the long run to accurate prediction of the future of play of the game. It follows that individual players, who know their own payoff matrices and choose strategies to maximize their expected utility, must eventually play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. An immediate corollary is that, when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information about opponents' payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the real game, as if they had complete information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game
Robinson, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969530 · Cited by 868
Cited by
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Cesa-Bianchi, N., & Lugosi, G. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546921 · Cited by 3,162
Economic Analysis of Social Interactions
Manski, C. F. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.115 · Cited by 2,064
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
Manski, C. F. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00537.x · Cited by 1,404
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change
GREIF, A., & LAITIN, D. D. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404041395 · Cited by 1,096
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
Friedman, D. (1998) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s001910050054 · Cited by 879
A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforcement learning
Hernandez-Leal, P., Kartal, B., & Taylor, M. E. (2019) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-019-09421-1 · Cited by 671
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory
Morris, S. (1995) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100003382 · Cited by 501
Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents
Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2709 · Cited by 457
Autonomous agents modelling other agents: A comprehensive survey and open problems
Albrecht, S. V., & Stone, P. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.01.002 · Cited by 417
“A well-known result by Kalai and Lehrer [163] states that, under a certain “absolute continuity” assumption regarding players’ beliefs, their prediction of future play will get arbitrarily close to the true future play and convergence to Nash equilibrium emerges.”
BackgroundInfluentialIf multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
Shoham, Y., Powers, R., & Grenager, T. (2007) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2006.02.006 · Cited by 410
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
Jehiel, P. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.003 · Cited by 399
Robust control and model misspecification
Hansen, L. P., Sargent, T. J., Turmuhambetova, G., & Williams, N. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.006 · Cited by 388
If You're so Smart, why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
Blume, L., & Easley, D. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00691.x · Cited by 386
LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION
Hanson, R. (2012) · The Journal of Prediction Markets · doi:10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417 · Cited by 360
A Framework for Sequential Planning in Multi-Agent Settings
Gmytrasiewicz, P. J., & Doshi, P. (2005) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1579 · Cited by 360
Brain, emotion and decision making: the paradigmatic example of regret
Coricelli, G., Dolan, R. J., & Sirigu, A. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.04.003 · Cited by 307
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?
Baland, J.-M., & Platteau, J.-P. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198290616.001.0001 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1019
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2097540415
- Cited by
- 697
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.