The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
Open accessAbstract
This paper discusses the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game, focusing on the structure of the matching process which describes how players meet.As in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) a combination of experimentation and myopia creates "evolutionary" forces which lead players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium.To describe play with finite time horizons it is necessary to consider the rates at which the dynamic systems converge.In large populations with uniform matching, play is determined largely by historical factors.In contrast, when players interact with small sets of neighbors it is more reasonable to assume that evolutionary forces may determine the outcome.
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Citations
Cites
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Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
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Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
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Freidlin, M. I., & Wentzell, A. D. (1984) · Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-0176-9 · Cited by 1,622
The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
Blume, L. E. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1023 · Cited by 1,402
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Sherman, M. J., & Ross, S. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288753 · Cited by 1,344
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Cited by
Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network
Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J., & Tardos, É. (2003) · Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining · doi:10.1145/956750.956769 · Cited by 7,326
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0273-0979-03-00988-1 · Cited by 1,354
Metadata
- Authors
- Ellison, G.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1047
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2142925354
- Cited by
- 1,106
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 17.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.