The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
Abstract
The authors characterize the symmetric equilibria of an investment game with a pure informational externality. When the period length is very short, the game ends very quickly; with positive probability, an informational cascade (herding) causes an investment collapse. As the period length increases, the possibility of herding disappears. As the number of players increases, the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players; adding more players simply increases the number who delay. In the limit, a period of low investment is followed by either an investment surge or a collapse. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
A Simple Model of Herd Behavior
Banerjee, A. V. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118364 · Cited by 6,556
PE, & Billingsley, P. (1996) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291440 · Cited by 6,481
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,597
Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment
Pindyck, R. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3307 · Cited by 2,403
Krugman, P. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937950 · Cited by 915
Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium
Matsuyama, K. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937949 · Cited by 694
How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
Vives, X. (1993) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298060 · Cited by 217
Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty
Rob, R. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297826 · Cited by 174
The Effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous Information
Cukierman, A. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260880 · Cited by 174
Cited by
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.3.151 · Cited by 1,915
Chapter 48 Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies
Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2004) · Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0080(04)80005-1 · Cited by 1,374
Really Uncertain Business Cycles
Bloom, N., Floetotto, M., Jaimovich, N., Saporta-Eksten, I., & Terry, S. J. (2018) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10927 · Cited by 1,120
Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., Dahleh, M. A., Lobel, I., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr004 · Cited by 754
Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1 · Cited by 705
Metadata
- Authors
- Chamley, C., & Gale, D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-09
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1065
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1538994871
- Cited by
- 489
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 11.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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