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Cited by 489

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment

Chamley, Christophe, Gale, Douglas·1994·Econometrica

Abstract

The authors characterize the symmetric equilibria of an investment game with a pure informational externality. When the period length is very short, the game ends very quickly; with positive probability, an informational cascade (herding) causes an investment collapse. As the period length increases, the possibility of herding disappears. As the number of players increases, the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players; adding more players simply increases the number who delay. In the limit, a period of low investment is followed by either an investment surge or a collapse. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

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Metadata

Authors
Chamley, C., & Gale, D.
Venue
Econometrica
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1994-09
Volume
62
Issue
5
Pages
1065
ISSN
0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1538994871
Cited by
489
References
11
FWCI
11.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2951507
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Chamley, C., & Gale, D. (1994). Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951507

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.