The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
Abstract
The authors consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which the size of the cake and the order in which players move follow a general Markov process. For games in which one agent makes an offer in each period and agreement must be unanimous, the authors provide characterizations of the sets of subgame perfect and stationary subgame perfect payoffs. With these characterizations, they investigate the uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcomes, the conditions under which agreement is delayed, and the advantage to proposing. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
A First Course in Stochastic Processes
(1975) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-1-28569-8 · Cited by 3,890
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,511
Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961664 · Cited by 1,970
Rubinstein, A., & Osborne, M. J. (1990) · Cited by 1,270
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Abreu, D. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911077 · Cited by 1,252
Discounted Dynamic Programming
Blackwell, D. (1965) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177700285 · Cited by 918
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
Sutton, J. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297715 · Cited by 587
Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913509 · Cited by 523
Admati, A. R., & Perry, M. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297563 · Cited by 344
A Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
Muthoo, A., Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1991) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554826 · Cited by 185
Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, L. (1990) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01755476 · Cited by 42
Cited by
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
SLANTCHEV, B. L. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000911 · Cited by 367
The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information
POWELL, R. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540400111x · Cited by 283
Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms
Simcoe, T. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.305 · Cited by 243
Metadata
- Authors
- Merlo, A., & Wilson, C.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-03
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 371
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1972681895
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 2.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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